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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3885 
___________ 
 
CYNTHIA M. YODER, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; ISMAE HERNANDEZ, V.P. LOAN DOCUMENTS; 
STEVENS & LEE, A STEVENS & LEE/GRIFFIN COMPANY; STEVENS & LEE 
LAWYERS AND CONSULTANTS; MS. STACEY SCRIVANI, ESQ.; MR. CRAIG A. 
HIRNEISEN, ESQ.; PHELAN HALLINAN & SCHMIEG, L.L.P.; JUSTIN M. SCHIFF, 
CURRENT ATTORNEY, DOCKET 11-11974; JENINE REBECCA DAVEY, UNITED 
STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT PHILADELPHIA, PA; MS. JENNIFER 
GORCHOW, BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEYS; MS. COURTENAY R. DUNN; MR. 
JOSEPH SCHALK; WILENTZ GOLDMAN & SPITZER; MR. DANIEL BERNHEIM, 
ESQ., ATTORNEYS FOR PHELAN HALLINAN & SCHMIEG, L.L.P.; COUNTY 
SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; CAROLYN B. WELSH; MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC.; 
MERSCORP, INC.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONI CHESTER REGISTRATION 
SYSTEM, INC.; SHARON MCGANN HORSTKAMP; CHESTER COUNTY 
RECORDER OF DEEDS; MR. RICK LOUGHERY; MR. LAWRENCE STENGEL; 
BB&T CORPORATION, MERGER QUESTIONS (888-822-6634) FORMERLY 
SUSQUEHANNA PATRIOT BANK; MR. EDWARD GRIFFITH; DAWSON R. 
MUTH, ESQ. (SOLICITOR FOR SHERIFF OFFICE OF CHESTER COUNTY);  
GOLDBERG, MEANIX, MCCALLIN & MUTH; USA BANK   
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-04721) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 3, 2017 
 
Before: VANASKIE, SHWARTZ and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
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(Opinion filed: July 12, 2017) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Cynthia Yoder appeals pro se from the District Court’s October 3, 2016 order 
dismissing her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm that order. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the background of this case 
only briefly.  Yoder is the daughter of Rance and Darlene Strunk, and she holds power of 
attorney for them.  In 2011, Wells Fargo initiated mortgage foreclosure proceedings 
against the Strunks in Pennsylvania state court.  Since that time, the District Court has 
entertained multiple pro se lawsuits brought by Yoder and the Strunks against Wells 
Fargo and others relating to the mortgage foreclosure. 
The District Court dismissed the first lawsuit in 2012 for failure to satisfy Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a pleading contain “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  The District Court 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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dismissed the second and third lawsuits in 2013 and 2014, respectively, for failure to 
satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) and because the claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  
The District Court dismissed the fourth lawsuit in March 2016, once again invoking the 
doctrine of res judicata.1  No appeal was taken from the first lawsuit, and we affirmed the 
District Court’s judgment in each of the three subsequent cases.  See Yoder v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 566 F. App’x 138, 142 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Strunk v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 614 F. App’x 586, 589 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Strunk v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 669 F. App’x 609, 610 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam).2      
In August 2016, Yoder, acting alone, filed another lawsuit in the District Court 
relating to the mortgage foreclosure.  The District Court granted her accompanying 
application to proceed in forma pauperis and screened the complaint pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).3  On October 3, 2016, the District Court dismissed Yoder’s 
complaint without leave to amend, concluding that the complaint was malicious under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i),4 that any new claims brought against the judges who handled the 
                                              
1 Yoder was not a plaintiff in the 2014 and 2016 cases. 
2 Yoder also filed a lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court, raising claims against the 
attorneys who had represented Wells Fargo in the foreclosure proceedings.  In 2012, the 
state court entered judgment in the defendants’ favor. 
3 Under this statute, a district court shall dismiss a complaint if it is “frivolous or 
malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary 
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).   
4 The District Court stated that Yoder’s complaint  
 
essentially duplicates the claims and allegations raised in her 
and her parents’ prior lawsuits even though those prior 
complaints were rejected by the courts.  In light of the fact 
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earlier state and federal cases were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, and that  
[the court] “cannot discern any other basis for [a] plausible claim that is not precluded.”  
(Dist. Ct. Mem. entered Oct. 3, 2016, at 8.)  This timely appeal followed.5 
II. 
 Yoder’s appellate brief does not challenge the District Court’s conclusion that her 
latest complaint is malicious under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Accordingly, we deem that issue 
waived.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 
F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in [her] opening 
brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that 
issue before this court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Emerson v. Thiel 
Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (applying waiver doctrine to pro 
se appeal).  On the other hand, Yoder’s brief appears to preserve a challenge to the 
District Court’s conclusion that the doctrine of judicial immunity barred her claims 
alleging that her rights were violated by the judges who presided over the earlier 
litigation.  Nevertheless, that challenge lacks merit.  See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 
302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties 
                                                                                                                                                  
that this is now the sixth case filed by Yoder and/or her 
parents concerning essentially the same subject matter, this 
Court concludes that the complaint filed amounts to an abuse 
of process which may be dismissed as malicious. 
 
(Dist. Ct. Mem. entered Oct. 3, 2016, at 6-7.)  
5 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”).  To the 
extent that Yoder contends that the District Judge who presided over the current action 
was biased against her, we see no evidence of any bias.6  We have considered the 
remaining arguments raised in Yoder’s brief and conclude that none of them entitles her 
to relief here. 
 In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s October 3, 2016 order 
dismissing Yoder’s complaint. 
 
                                              
6 Any dissatisfaction that Yoder might have with the District Judge’s decision is not a 
basis for the District Judge’s recusal.  See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom 
Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). 
